What the model does, how it was tested, and — the part most tools leave out — where it is weak.
After each market close the 1,457 most liquid US common stocks are scored on the model's weighted themes — value, quality (growth, for younger companies), momentum, size, capital discipline, institutional positioning and insider activity, each carrying an equal share. Each theme is built from individual numbers, each number is standardised across the names scored that day, and the themes are combined into one composite. The Hot Stocks tab is that ranking. Whether every weighted theme reaches a live score today could not be read; the Hot Stocks tab reports it on every scan.
The research also constructs a book from that ranking — the top decile of the large-cap tier, score-weighted, capped at 8% per name — and tracks it forward against the S&P 500. That book is fixed at each quarterly rebalance and held unchanged between them: the ranking moves daily, the Index does not, and the holdings shown are the book in force rather than a fresh cut of today's scan. Both are shown in the app: the Valquo Index tab lists that book and carries its forward record, which also appears on the home hero; the Track Record tab is the options paper book, a different object. The Index's holdings and its curve are the same book. They are a model portfolio with no money in it, published so the method can be checked, not as a recommendation to hold any of it.
The backtest is built from a point-in-time fundamentals panel: on any historical date the model sees only what was actually public and filed by then. Restated figures do not leak backwards. Institutional (13F) holdings are lagged by their real filing deadline — the panel's effective lag is about 111 days, more conservative than the 45-day rule. We checked this the direct way: feeding the model fresher, not-yet-filed holdings makes it weaker, not stronger, which is the opposite of what a look-ahead artefact does.
Delisted and acquired companies stay in the universe up to the date they disappear, using a delisting mask rather than today's surviving-company list. A backtest run on the names that still exist is a backtest of not going bankrupt. The live forward track has the same property by construction: the picks are dated when they are made and measured forward, so nothing can be quietly dropped after the fact.
Trading costs are modelled, not assumed away. The research decile's breakeven cost is about 123 basis points one-way against a measured 77 bps real-world cost profile, on 247% annual turnover — a margin of about 1.6×. We lead with the breakeven deliberately: it requires you to believe no particular cost estimate.
Which book this describes. This is the research decile (deployed equal-weight, flat 1/7) — the ranking across the whole 9,645-name universe over 69 quarterly rebalances, at the taxable cadence. It is not the Valquo Index, which is a narrower long-only book of large caps. The two are different objects and their cost figures are not interchangeable. Borrow cost is not modelled, which affects the long/short statistic but not the long-only book the Index is.
The composite is roughly one-seventh each of value, quality, momentum, size, investment discipline and institutional ownership — nearly the standard factor set — so "it beat the average" could not distinguish a real edge from an assembly of known premia. Two write-ups were prepared before the regression ran: one to publish if the intercept cleared Newey–West t > 2, and one saying the honest description was efficient factor exposure if it did not.
It cleared it. Against the Fama–French five factors plus momentum, the top-decile spread carries an intercept of +5.94%/yr (t = 4.45) — that is the research decile, the ranking across all 9,645 companies equal-weighted, and not the Valquo Index — over 68 non-overlapping windows, 2009–2026, with all six pre-registered specifications positive at t > 2 and spanning +5.7% to +9.3%. Run through the same pipeline, a passive large-cap ETF returns +0.68%/yr (t 1.58) — the placebo that shows the machinery reports nothing significant when there is nothing there.
Net of this project's own measured trading costs the intercept is +4.06%/yr (t = 3.01), so it still clears the bar set before the test was run — about 1.9 points of the gross figure going to costs. One honest reading of the same arithmetic does not clear. The cost leg charges the one-way cost on the entering side only; charged on both sides, as this project's cost model does elsewhere, the drag roughly doubles and the intercept falls to +2.29%/yr (t = 1.71), under the threshold. Both are stated because the difference crosses the bar, and which one is the registered figure is a question for the register that wrote the formula rather than for this page.
The same regression on the corrected universe also removes something this page could previously lean on: the equal-weighted universe's own unexplained excess was +2.3%/yr and is now −0.4%/yr, not separable from zero. That makes the decile's intercept a cleaner number and takes away a second argument, which is the trade a wider universe turned out to be.
Every headline figure this project publishes is measured over a 63-trading-day forward window, which was an inherited default rather than a measured optimum. So the composite was scored at 8 horizons — one quarter through two years — from a single panel build, on the set of dates observable at every horizon, so that the length of the window is the only thing that varies. The result: INTERMEDIATE. In the backtest, the top decile of the hot list beat the equal-weighted universe by about 6.07% annualized over the next three months — and was still ahead by about 2.56% annualized two years later, a lower rate rather than the same one — the decay is why this panel's shape is INTERMEDIATE where the previous one measured CONSTANT-RATE — even though a given name typically stays in the top decile for only one quarterly rebalance.
An independent route reaches the same place without touching the decile machinery: the median per-date rank correlation between score and forward return rises with horizon, 0.0594 at one quarter to 0.1017 at two years. And the alpha is well measured at every horizon — its t-statistic never falls below 3.02, and is 3.38 at two years — so this is not a signal that survives because its error bars widened. What it does do is decay: on this universe the annualized alpha falls from 6.07% at one quarter to 2.56% at two years, where the previous 2,531-name panel measured it essentially flat. Positive at every horizon, at a lower rate the longer you hold.
The research also runs an options book, and its hit rate is 35-37% depending on which book you measure. That number is the one most likely to be misread, so here is the whole distribution rather than the average. Over 3,885 simulated trades on 187 names, 2016-01 to 2025-10:
The middle trade loses 52% of the premium. The trades that at least doubled are 87% of everything the winners made. A book like this is supposed to lose most of the time, and a string of losses is its normal texture rather than a sign it has stopped working.
How long is an ordinary bad run? Expect losing streaks. Over 20 trades the typical worst run is 5 in a row, 44% of stretches contain a run of 6 or worse, and the record's worst at this scale is 20. Losing runs are longer than a coin-flip model predicts, because trades opened near each other in time share a market: the clustering measures 2.667 against a shuffled null whose 95th percentile is 1.244 (1,000 shuffles, p < 0.001). Assuming independence would put the 95th-percentile worst run at 10 instead of the measured 12 — so the tidy arithmetic is the one that would cry wolf.
It is not a forecast, not personalised advice, and not a claim that the next twelve months will resemble the backtest. It is a disciplined, auditable ranking with its assumptions and its failures written down. If a page here ever shows you a number without telling you whether it is backtested or live, that is a bug — please report it.
It is also not a signal service. The app does show a model portfolio, options alerts and forward records — but every one of them is a paper record, and they are not the same KIND of paper: the Valquo Index is a model book priced at closing marks with no broker account of any kind, while the options book runs in a broker sandbox containing no real money. They are published so the method can be checked against what actually happened next, and they are labelled thin until they are long enough to mean anything. None of it is a return anyone received, and the options alerts in particular were tested and found to lose to random entry (above). Treat everything here as analysis you can check, not something to act on.